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In 1997, Diane Blood famously won a court case allowing her to export the
sperm of her dead husband from England to Belgium with the goal of conceiving a
1
child with the assistance of medical technology. The pictures of a smiling Ms.
Blood exiting the British Court after her initial victorious ruling, and later on, her
pictures with her first, and then second, son have captured much international
attention. Since then, more and more children have been posthumously conceived,
and the phenomenon has received growing attention. Not only does posthumous
conception capture the social imagination in its construction of parenthood and
families, but it also raises new legal quandaries. Questions about the scope of
reproductive freedom, the limits of consent, and the value of genetic material as
property are all pertinent. As adults make reproductive choices, physicians provide
the needed medical services, and courts adjudicate related dilemmas, debates over
posthumous conception have centered on the rights and interests of the adults at
stake.


I want to thank Cleveland-Marshall College of Law for organizing and hosting the
symposium, especially Professor Browne C. Lewis, Sasha M. Swoveland (Senior Editor) and
Trent Stechschulte (Editor-in-Chief) as well as the Publication Editors, Ami Imbrogno and
Katharine Green, for their assistance with this publication.
1
R. v Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood, [1997] EWCA
(Civ) 4003, [70], [1997] 2 WLR 806 (Q.B.D.) (Eng.). In this case, a first sample of sperm was
extracted by electro-ejaculation when the husband was in coma; a second sample was
extracted shortly before the husband was certified clinically death. The samples were kept by
the Infertility Research Trust; however, it refused to release the sperm to Ms. Blood. The
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority did not approve the release on the grounds
that the requirements of “written and effective consent of a man” were not met. Id. at [2]–[3],
[5].
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Significantly less attention has been given to the resulting children. Certainly,
this neglect may be at least partially attributed to the focus on the moral and legal
status of embryos or even pre-embryonic entities. But as children are the end goal of
the procedure, attention to their interests and rights is cardinal. Are posthumously
conceived children harmed by being born? What rights do posthumously conceived
children have—or should they have? How can their interests be protected? And
importantly, how do children conceptualize the related rights and interests for
themselves?
This essay considers posthumous conception from an international and childcentered approach. After a sketch in Part I of the phenomenon of posthumous
conception and the complexities it evokes, Part II examines the types of issues
arising in court cases concerning posthumous conception. Part III considers how
courts in their rulings have addressed the welfare and best interests of posthumously
conceived children and analyzes the scope and meaning of relevant decisions. Part
IV looks into children’s rights or interests raised in those judicial decisions: parental
acknowledgement, family structures, identity harm, and inheritance and social
2
benefits. This part draws on the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), a
prime instrument to advance children’s rights on the international level,
incorporating as much as possible the perspectives of children. I argue that the
discourse must include concern for the rights and interests of posthumously
conceived children and that a new special category of children who are “outcast”
cannot stand the test of equality and non-discrimination, nor of the entrenched
principles of child welfare and best interests. Moreover, I suggest that attending to
children’s perspectives may illuminate the gaps in the current discourse and what
needs to be addressed. Finally, Part V draws some conclusions and calls for a more
relational approach to ensure that posthumously conceived children do not pay the
price of their parents’ decisions and that their welfare and best interests are upheld.
I. THE PHENOMENON OF POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION
Although in most societies procreation holds a central place in one’s community
and one’s own social fabric, no other medical development has raised as many
opposing voices as assisted reproductive technologies. The phenomenon of
posthumous conception is no different; on the contrary, it both revisits and extends
controversies about the scope of reproductive freedom, the family, and medical
technologies. In explaining the excitement—and criticism—that arose, this Part
highlights why this phenomenon has captured national and international attention
and pinpoints the ethical and legal dilemmas that ensue.
The first reason for the growing interest in posthumous conception is the
sensational nature of the issue. While examples of children born after the death of
3
their fathers (“posthumous birth”) can be found in earliest history, the phenomenon
of posthumous conception, in which medical technologies are used to achieve a
pregnancy, is relatively new. Although sperm freezing became possible in 1949,

2

Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, U.N. GAOR, Supp.
No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49, at 167, (Sept. 2, 1990).
3
Michael R. Soules, Commentary: Posthumous Harvesting of Gametes – A Physician’s
Perspective, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 362, 362 (1999).
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4

reports suggest that the first posthumous conception occurred in 1977, the first
5
posthumous sperm retrieval was in 1980, and the first child born after posthumous
6
sperm retrieval was Liam, the Blood’s child, in 1998. Egg retrieval and preservation
7
is even more recent. Because egg harvesting from a live woman is significantly
8
more medically complicated than retrieving sperm (even from a dead man), it
became possible only in the late 1970s with the development of in-vitro-fertilization
9
(IVF): the first reported case of birth after egg freeze was in 1986. Further, although
harvesting of female ova or tissue is now possible, using eggs that were extracted
posthumously or from a dying woman (without her full cooperation) is ever more
complex. Gestation requires a surrogate mother. Yet this is fraught with social and
ethical disagreements, and legally, many countries prohibit the practice of
10
surrogacy. Consequently, there are no published reports of children born as a result
11
of these recent techniques, and the court only approved—for the first and possibly
only time—a family’s request to extract eggs from a woman who was declared brain
4
Alberta Law Reform Inst., Succession and Posthumously Conceived Children: Report
for Discussion, ALRI PUBLICATIONS, 1, 3, 5 (Jan. 2012), http://www.law.ualberta.ca/
alri/docs/rfd023.pdf.
5
Cappy M. Rothman, A Method for Obtaining Viable Sperm in the Postmortem State, 34
FERTILITY & STERILITY 512, 512 (1980).
6
Jason Pobjoy, Medically Mediated Reproduction: Posthumous Conception and the Best
Interests of the Child, 15 J.L. & MED. 450, 452 (2007).
7

See Jason D. Hans, Attitudes Toward Posthumous Harvesting and Reproduction, 32
DEATH STUD. 837, 838–39 (2008).
8
Egg retrieval requires one-to-two weeks of hormonal ovarian stimulation before
harvesting of eggs can take place. Id. at 838.
9
Christopher Chen, Pregnancy After Human Oocyte Cryopreservation, 327 THE LANCET
884, 884–86 (1986).The second reported case of birth after egg freeze was in 1987. J.F.H.M.
Van Uem et al., Birth After Cryopreservation of Unfertilized Oocytes, 329 LANCET 752, 752–
53 (1987).
10

Italy, for instance, prohibits both altruistic and commercial surrogacy. Germany, France,
various states in the U.S., Switzerland, Greece, Spain, Norway, New Zealand, and several
Australian states prohibit commercial surrogacy as well, though New Zealand allows altruistic
surrogacy if an ethics committee approves the procedure in advance. John A. Robertson,
Protecting Embryos and Burdening Women: Assisted Reproduction in Italy, 19 HUM. REPROD.
1693, 1693 (2004); Usha R. Smerdon, Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: International
Surrogacy Between the United States and India, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 24–26 (2008). In
Israel, because of various religious limitations, only full surrogacy is allowed (i.e., the
surrogate is not genetically linked to the child), and the regulations also require that the
surrogate and the intended mother belong to the same religion. A new law regulating ova
donations in Israel entered into force in March 2011 allowing Israeli women between the ages
of twenty and thirty-five to donate ova in exchange for some payment. Dan Even, Knesset
Approves Revolutionary Law Allowing Domestic Ova Donations, HAARETZ (Isr.), June 9,
2010, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/knesset-approves-revolutionary-lawallowing-domestic-ova-donations-1.295004. The egg donation must be anonymous and to
ensure the maternal religious linage the donor‘s and the recipient‘s religion must be matched.
Id. Also, a baby born to a Jewish family from a non-Jewish donor will have to undergo
conversion. Id.
11

Hans, supra note 7, at 839.
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12

dead as recently as 2011. Thus, posthumous conception using gametes extracted
during life for reproduction after the man or woman died—or following the retrieval
of sperm or especially egg from the dead—represents the most recent form of the
“new family.”
Second, posthumous conception marks another shift in the social construction of
kinship. Certainly, the scientific revolution in fertility treatments had already
shattered the traditional conceptualization of the family as a union between a man
and a woman. New technologies like hormone treatment, IVF, and gamete donation
gave a couple the chance of overcoming infertility. They also enabled single women,
gay couples, and transgender individuals to become biological parents. Indeed, such
non-traditional families turned into visible consumers in the market for assisted
13
reproductive technologies.
Nonetheless, the phenomenon of posthumous
conception is unique among those new technologies. It does suggest some sort of
continuation of the traditional family structure of a husband and wife (and
increasingly, also of other unmarried heterosexual couples) even if one party to the
14
relationship is no longer alive. But, while the law commonly treats children born
within a certain accepted time period after the father’s death (generally, around three
hundred days from the father’s death) as any other child who is born “into the
15
marriage,” posthumous conception can extend the timeframe for a “marital child”
16
for a longer period, and potentially, indefinitely.
12
David Regev, Woman’s Dream to Have a Child Fulfilled After Death, YNETNEWS.COM
(June 14, 2011), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4081456,00.html; Mikaela
Conley, Harvesting Dead Girl’s Eggs Raises Ethical Issues, CBS NEWS (August 11, 2011),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504763_162-20091343-10391704.html.Whether an adolescent
can consent to parent a child after his or her death (and if so, from what age) is another
interesting question concerning children’s rights. However, it is beyond the scope of this
article.
13

Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible
Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 31–33 (2008); June Carbone, If I Say “Yes”
to Regulation Today, Will You Still Respect Me in the Morning?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1747, 1763–64 (2008); Kathryn D. Katz, Parenthood from the Grave: Protocols for
Retrieving and Utilizing Gametes from the Dead or Dying, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 289, 293–
94 (2006); Paul Lauritzen, What Price Parenthood?, 20 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 38 (1990).
Some scholars made a distinction between medical infertility and so-called “social infertility.”
The latter refers especially to single mothers or same-sex couples who cannot achieve
pregnancy due to a lack of a partner or of interest in having a sexual relationship with another
person from the opposite sex. Daar, supra at 31–32. See also Julien S. Murphy, Should
Lesbians Count as Infertile Couples? Antilesbian Discrimination in Assisted Reproduction, in
EMBODYING BIOETHICS: RECENT FEMINIST ADVANCES 103, 103 (Anne Donchin & Laura M.
Purdy eds., 1999).
14

Bob Simpson, Making ‘Bad’ Deaths ‘Good’: the Kinship Consequences of Posthumous
Conception, 7 ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 1, 3 (2001).
15

BROWNE C. LEWIS, PAPA’S BABY: PATERNITY AND ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 113–14
(2012).
16
Sperm Cryopreservation allows for sperms to remain viable for a long period of time.
While the maximum period of time for such preservation is unknown, estimates range from
twelve years to centuries. Joshua Greenfield, Dad Was Born A Thousand Years Ago?
Examination of Post-Mortem Conception and Inheritance, with a Focus on the Rule Against
Perpetuities, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 277, 280–81 (2006). Embryo freezing is another
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Simultaneously, posthumous conception opens the door for significantly more
complex familial relationships. So far, the most common scenario is that the life
partner of the deceased, generally his widow or girlfriend, seeks to use his frozen
gametes herself, intending to fertilize the egg and carry the pregnancy to term.
17
Increasingly, however, other scenarios are arising. For instance, a surviving
husband who has possession of frozen embryos he had created with his now
deceased wife can contract with a surrogate mother to carry the pregnancy to term
18
(this happened recently in Israel ); he might just as well decide to remarry and
request that the new wife be implanted with the embryos created with the previous
wife. Parents of a deceased or dying person can request that doctors harvest the
19
gametes of their loved ones for donation or to be used along with gamete donation
20
or surrogacy to create a grandchild. Third parties may further gain possession of
gametes or frozen embryos when either one, or both, genetic parents die, and these
new owners could either carry the pregnancy or contract with a surrogate to undergo
a pregnancy. In cases of gamete donation, a third party might purchase gametes if
fertility clinics do not discard them after the donor’s death. Moreover, given the rise
in legal recognition of same-sex couples as family units, the surviving partner of a
21
same-sex couple may soon turn to posthumous conception as well. For a gay man,
that would mean using the sperm of the deceased partner and would require a
common practice that allows extending viability of gamete for long periods. Given that it
requires a male partner, it is limited in its support for single women who want to extend their
reproductive period. Cryopreservation is increasingly used also for eggs and ovarian tissues.
Only limited data exists regarding the effect of duration of egg and ovarian preservation on the
rates of viability and pregnancy; one study showed that, in terms of survival, fertilization,
embryo quality, etc., the results after forty-eight months storage are comparable to shorter
periods of storage. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Mature Oocyte Cryopreservation: A
Guideline, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY 37, 40 (2013). Note that contrary to some states in the
United States (such as New York), where the laws or professional guidelines do not prescribe
maximum storage time on gamete and embryo cryopreservation, some countries require that
such storage does not exceed certain time periods as provided by law (in the United Kingdom,
for instance, it stands on ten years). As technologies further develop, however, the time
limitation is likely to increase. Surrogacy can further extend the period of reproduction: it
removes the barrier of women’s infertility due to age.
17

Gary S. Nakhuda, Posthumous Assisted Reproduction, 28 SEMINARS IN REPROD. MED.
329, 329–31 (2010).
18

Dan Even, Israeli Woman Becomes Mother Two Years After Dying of Cancer, HAARETZ
(Isr.), June 14, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israeli-woman-becomesmother-two-years-after-dying-of-cancer-1.367523.
19

This was one of the intentions of the parents of the deceased 17-year-old girl in the case
of Chen Ayash. Nitzi Yakov, Court Permits Harvest of Dead Girl’s Eggs, Father Decides He
Does Not Want to Use Them, ISRAELHAYOM.COM (August 8, 2011), http://www.israelhayom.
com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=632. However, according to media reports the deceased
father ultimately was uncomfortable with the possibility of donating her eggs to an infertile
woman and the family decided to destroy the eggs. Id.
20

Michael Leidig, Russian Woman May Lose Grandson Conceived from Dead Son’s
Frozen Sperm, 332 BMJ 627, 627 (2006).
21
Such an option is also explicitly endorsed by some laws (e.g. in Victoria, Australia and
in the United Kingdom). See infra note 51; infra Part II.
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surrogate and an egg donor to bear a child who is not genetically related to him. In
the case of a lesbian woman, she may seek to take an embryo from her deceased
partner’s eggs and a sperm donor (whether created while she was alive or after her
death) and have it transferred to her own uterus, to that of a surrogate, or to that of a
new partner. In each of these cases, it is unclear who should be registered as the
father or mother on the child’s birth certificate or acknowledged as the child’s
parent. In short, medical advances in posthumous conception mean that questions
about kinship, familial relationships, and parentage have become more complicated,
and are likely to become even more so.
Finally, posthumous conception creates a new front in reproductive choice.
22
While parental reproductive freedom is often viewed as a basic right, its
entanglement with medical technologies that enable people to materialize this right
23
beyond the “natural” has raised acrimonious debates. Supporters of reproductive
freedom have argued that (considering the financial, social, emotional, and other
burdens associated with raising a child) parental decisions about the sort of
24
commitment they want and can undertake should be respected. Accordingly, the
right to reproductive freedom should include the choice of how to procreate and
25
under what circumstances to do so. Critics, conversely, have suggested that
22
International human rights treaties include reference to the right to found a family. See
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), at
16 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/6316, at 23 (Dec. 16, 1966); Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 67 B, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106, at 23 (Jan. 24, 2007); Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/34/46, at 23 (Dec. 18, 1979). Notwithstanding the internationally recognized
right to found a family, both the right to reproduce and the right not to reproduce are fraught
with controversies. Scholarly work has highlighted racial, ethnic, cultural, and economic
discrimination; other controversies include the imposed sterilization throughout history of
women deemed unsuitable for parenthood (because of their skin color, disability, etc.) and the
impact of lack of access to other social and health benefits on the ability to exercise the right
to found a family. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Deep Purple: Religious Shades of
Family Law, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 459, 459–500 (2007–2008); Dorothy E. Roberts, The
Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 209–73 (1995); Hawley Fogg-Davis, Navigating Race in
the Market for Human Gametes, 31 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 13, 13–21 (2001); see also, Maya
Sabatello, Who’s Got Parental Rights? The Intersection Between Infertility, Reproductive
Technologies, and Disability Rights Law, 6 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 227, 227–59 (2010).
23
The right “[t]o enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications” may further
strengthen an argument for reproductive freedom through assisted reproductive technologies.
This right is stipulated in Article 15(1)(b) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
& Cultural Rights. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Jan. 3, 1976). See also, Maya Sabatello, Advancing Transgender’s
Family Rights through Science – A Proposal for An Alternative Framework, 33 HUM. RTS. Q.
43, 43–75 (2011).
24

John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B. U. L. REV.
421, 421–82 (1996); Richard J. Hull, Cheap Listening?—Reflections on the Concept of
Wrongful Disability, 20 BIOETHICS 55, 55–63 (2006).
25
John A. Robertson et al., Conception to Obtain Hematopoietic Stem Cells, 32 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 34, 34–40 (2002); John A. Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, Choosing Genes,
and the Scope of Reproductive Freedom, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490, 1490–1513 (20072008).
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procreation through the use of assisted reproductive technologies, especially by
untraditional families—single mothers and same sex couples—are a form of child
26
abuse. They have emphasized that preserving the institution of parenthood “the
way we know it” is the only way to meet each child’s “need” for a mother and a
27
father. Opponents of posthumous conception in particular contend that a resulting
child may be a “substitute” for the lost spouse, and that the grieving process of the
surviving spouse constitutes a psychological instability that would impair the child’s
28
future welfare. They are therefore opposed to the extension of the fundamental
29
right to procreate after death.
As I discuss elsewhere, these latter arguments may be based on religious—rather
30
than scientific—grounds. The extent to which they are relevant is consequently
dependent on one’s religious views and, generally, national policies in liberal states
should not be determined on such religious basis. Nonetheless, posthumous
conception undoubtedly further complicates parental reproductive choice. It expands
the concept of reproductive freedom beyond the lifetime of the individual. It also
raises significant questions about the limits of reproductive choice. The suggestion
that people might use the genetic material of their deceased children—and the
increasing number of requests to do this—exemplifies this issue. Can an individual
claim a right to become a grandparent? And what are the limits of consent in such
scenarios? A situation where future grandparents donate the genetic material of their
deceased child so that another man or a woman becomes a parent is relatively
31
uncomplicated.
In such instances, the recipient parent holds the primary
responsibilities for the child, and the grandparents may or may not have a
relationship with the resulting child. But can the deceased request that his or her
mother (and future grandparent) carry the pregnancy? Can the future grandmother
consent to such a request or choose it on her own? Should fertility clinics accept
such requests or consent? These questions, combined with the fact that the
implications of all these possibilities on the resulting child are unclear, shift
posthumous conception from a mere matter of privacy to one that may have
32
significant implications for the public interest.

26

Eric Blyth, To Be or Not to Be? A Critical Appraisal of the Welfare of Children
Conceived through New Reproductive Technologies, 16 INT’L J. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 505, 506
(2008).
27

ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, INST. FOR AM. VALUES, THE REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD:
THE EMERGING GLOBAL CLASH BETWEEN ADULT RIGHTS AND CHILDREN’S NEEDS 15–16
(2006), available at http://familyscholars.org/2006/01/01/the-revolution-in-parenthood/.
28
J.A.M. Hunfeld, et al. Protect the Child from Being Born: Arguments Against IVF from
Heads of the 13 Licensed Dutch Fertility Centres, Ethical and Legal Perspectives, 22 J.
REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOLOGY 279, 284 (2004); Katz, supra note 13, at 309–10.
29

Kristin L. Antall, Who is My Mother?: Why States Should Ban Posthumous
Reproduction by Women, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 203, 227–29 (1999).
30
Maya Sabatello, Are the Kids All Right? A Child-Centered Approach to Assisted
Reproductive Technologies, 31 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 74, 82–84 (2013).
31

See infra Part III.

32

Simpson, supra note 14, at 2.
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As a matter of policy, it is possible to regulate this field so as to prohibit any or
all such scenarios of posthumously conceived children. Indeed, this is the position
33
endorsed in France, Germany, and Sweden, for instance. However, it is unlikely to
be universally endorsed. In the United States, assisted reproductive technology is a
34
highly lucrative business, primarily in private hands. There is consequently little
incentive to curb it and great difficulty in doing so. Moreover, some countries
explicitly allow posthumous conception when certain conditions are met. For
instance, in the state of Victoria, Australia, the Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act
of 2008 permits posthumous conception when the recipient was married to the
deceased partner, the deceased provided written consent for the procedure, the
recipient received counseling prior to the treatment about the grieving process and
the possible impact on the child to be born as a result of the treatment, and the
35
Patient Review Panel approved the use of gametes or embryos. The United
Kingdom’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 2008 similarly allows for
posthumous conception when the deceased provided sperm and consented in writing
both for the use of his sperm by a specific woman after his death and for being
treated for the purpose of parentage registration in the birth certificate as the father
36
of any resulting child. This law also makes arrangements for situations where an
embryo was created during a marriage or a civil partnership using the sperm of a
37
donor (rather than of the deceased) with the consent of the deceased. The recipient
woman is additionally required to acknowledge in writing, within forty-two days of
38
the child’s birth, the deceased’s parentage. And while the New Zealand Human
Assisted Reproductive Technology Act of 2004 does not dedicate a separate section
to posthumous conception, it allows such conceptions when the condition of
39
informed consent for the collection of gametes, embryos, or both, is met.
Finally, the rise of “rights talk” combined with new medical practices plays an
important role in the endorsement of posthumous conception as a legitimate form of
reproduction. Doctors encourage patients who undergo medical treatment that may
33

Hans, supra note 7, at 893.

34

See Daar, supra note 13, at 36.

35

Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) ss 46, 91(c), 96(c) (Austl.); see also
Assisted Reproductive Treatment Regulations 2009 (Vic) s 11 (Austl.). There are no
comprehensive national regulations of assisted reproductive technologies in Australia, and the
individual states are free to adopt relevant arrangements. However, the Australian government
issued ethical standards guiding the practice in 2007. These regulations allow for posthumous
conception if the deceased or the near dying person has left a clearly expressed and witnessed
direction consenting to the use of his or her gametes, the prospective parent received
counseling about the consequences of such use, and an appropriate period of time for the
grieving process was taken before assisting in conception attempts. Ethical Guidelines on the
Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research 2004, (Cth) ss
6.15–16 (Austl.).
36

Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22, § 39 (Eng.). This amendment to
the Act is the result of the 2003 legal struggle of Diane Blood to have her dead husband
registered as the father of her posthumously conceived children.
37

Id. §§ 40(1), 40(2), 42 (Eng.).

38

Id. §§ 39(d), 40(f) (Eng.).

39

Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 (N.Z.).

2014]

AN INTERNATIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE

37

negatively affect their reproduction (such as cancer patients undergoing
chemotherapy) to preserve sperm or eggs beforehand, and such harvesting is part of
40
routine medical practice today. As some may eventually succumb to the disease,
their stored gametes may be available for use. Beyond that, because reproduction is
viewed as a fundamental right, individuals and governments are increasingly
invested in protecting it. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the Ministry of
Defense provides “all military personnel with pre-deployment advice on fertility
preservation,” and although pre-deployment preservation is not funded by the
government, it is reported that a “government-recognized program will allow British
41
soldiers to continue their bloodline even if mortally wounded in battle.” In the
United States, while pre-deployment fertility preservation by soldiers is privately
organized and funded, it is reported as a growing (and accepted) trend among
42
soldiers deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East. And in Israel,
although there are no comprehensive national regulations of assisted reproductive
technologies, posthumous conception is increasingly viewed as a right on its own—
43
and is extended to future grandparents. Young adults entering the army and other
individuals are encouraged to sign a so-called “biological will” to specify what
44
should be done with genetic material in case of death. More than six hundred such
wills were already signed and they are deposited in the first and only bank for
45
biological wills in the world.
Prohibiting posthumous conception is further difficult given globalization and the
so-called phenomenon of fertility tourism, in which individuals and couples travel
outside of their home country to receive fertility treatment and other services such as
46
surrogacy and gamete donation. The reality is that those who want the opportunity

40

Sara E. Barton et al., Population-Based Study of Attitudes Toward Posthumous
Reproduction, 98 FERTILITY & STERILITY 735, 735–36 (2012).
41

Jim Kouri, Brit Soldiers in Afghanistan Freezing Sperm, TELEGRAPH, Feb. 20, 2011,
http://www.examiner.com/article/brit-soldiers-afghanistan-freezing-sperm; Sperm Freezing
Should be Funded by MoD: Injured Soldier, BBC NEWS (June 9, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-lancashire-13709751?print=true.
42
Valerie Alvord, Troops Start Trend with Sperm Banks, USA TODAY, Jan. 26, 2003,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-01-26-sperm-inside_x.htm#.
43

Grandparents Rights, NEW FAMILY, http://www.newfamily.org.il/en/grandparentsrights/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
44

Ronny Linder-Ganz, Reservists Ask for Their Sperm to Be Frozen if They Die, HAARETZ
(Isr.), Sept. 26, 2013, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/reservists-ask-fortheir-sperm-to-be-frozen-if-they-die.premium-1.479114.
45

The Bank for biological wills was established by the New Family Organization, a
leading family rights non-governmental organization that promoted the issue. Both the
concept of biological will and the bank are protected under patent laws. For further
information see, www.newfamily.org.il.
46

Smerdon, supra note 10, at 24–26; Richard F. Storrow, Family Tales: The Handmaid’s
Tale of Fertility Tourism: Passports and Third Parties in the Religious Regulation of Assisted
Conception, 12 TEXAS WESLEYAN L. REV. 189, 202–03 (2005–2006).
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to have a child with their deceased loved ones will find a way to do so. The
practice of posthumous conception is, thus, unlikely to disappear anytime soon.
Assuming that children should not pay the price of parental decisions, it is
important to consider how to uphold the interests and rights of children that are born
from posthumous conception. Yet, to what extent have courts deciding on cases
involving posthumously conceived children done so?
II. POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION IN COURTS
Since the victorious ruling in the Blood case that enabled Diane to procreate
through the use of her dead husband’s sperm in 1997, many cases pertaining to
posthumous conception have arrived in courts. Specifically, four types of cases can
be observed.
In the first kind of case, a person requests permission to harvest gametes from a
recently-deceased or dying patient. Such cases are especially prevalent in
48
Australia. They are rather urgent given the time limits on extracting viable sperm
49
or eggs, and commonly in such cases, an additional court decision is required in
50
order to get permission to use the harvested gametes. This is also an instance of the
second type of case. A surviving partner or parent might ask for permission to use
the gametes that the deceased had frozen before going onto a medical treatment
(such as chemotherapy) or had asked to have harvested shortly before or after death.
51
Both Australian and Israeli courts have delivered opinions in this regard. In the
47

In ex parte Blood, the British Court ruled that although the harvesting of sperm from
Ms. Blood’s dying husband should not have taken place given the lack of clear and written
consent, once it was done Ms. Blood had the right, under the law of the European Community,
to export the sperm for the purpose of received medical treatment in other EU members. R. v
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood, [1997] EWCA (Civ) 4003,
[70], [1997] 2 WLR 806 (Q.B.D.) (Eng.). Subsequently, Ms. Blood conceived her two
children in fertility clinics in Belgium. Lucie Morris, Second Baby for Diane Blood, DAILY
MAIL (Sept. 26, 2013) http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-128719/Second-baby-DianeBlood.html; see also Derek Morgan & Robert G. Lee, In the Name of the Father? Ex Parte
Blood: Dealing with Novelty and Anomaly, 60 MOD. L. REV. 840 (1997) (discussing the
European standards regarding free movement and services); Benjamin Kroon et al., Postmortem Sperm Retrieval in Australia, 52 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 487,
488 (2012) (discussing the law in Victoria, Australia that allows exportation of retrieved
sperm to a State or a Territory that allows use without written consent of the deceased).
48
In the matter of Gray [2000] QSC 390 (Austl.); MAW v W. Sydney Area Health Serv.
[2000] NSWSC 358; 49 NSWLR 231 (Austl.); S v Minister for Health (WA) [2008] WASC
262 (Austl.); Re Floyd [2011] QSC 218 (Austl.); Re H, AE [2012] SASC 146 (Austl.).
49

The medical recommendation for posthumous harvesting and preservation of sperm is
that extraction take place within twenty-four hours after death, although the sperm may
remain viable longer (up to forty-eight hours) if the body has been cooled. Katrina Bills, The
Ethics and Legality of Posthumous Conception, 9 S. CROSS U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005); Bryce
Weber, Ron Kodama, and Keith Jarvi, Postmortem Sperm Retrieval: The Canadian
Perspective, 30 J. ANDROLOGY 407, 407 (2009).
50

See In the matter of Gray [2000] QSC at ¶ 4; see also S v Minister for Health, [2008]
WASC at ¶¶ 17, 25; Re H, AE, [2012] SASC at ¶¶ 12, 49.
51
Vallance & Marco [2012] FamCA 653 (Austl.); Jocelyn Edwards; Re the estate of the
late Mark Edwards [2011] NSWSC 478 (Austl.); Re H, AE (No 2) [2012] SASC 177 (Austl.);
AB v Attorney-General of Victoria [2005] VSC 180 (Austl.); 13530/08 Family Court (Krayot),

2014]

AN INTERNATIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE

39

third type of case, a posthumously conceived child has already been born and the
surviving parent (generally, the widow) submits a request for recognition of the
deceased’s parentage. Diane Blood, for instance, had filed such a request in the
52
United Kingdom after the birth of her first son. These requests are especially
prevalent in Japan where all legal cases of posthumous conception focus on the issue
53
of parentage acknowledgment and registration in the child’s birth certificate.
Finally, in the fourth type of case, the courts were called upon to determine whether
a posthumously conceived child should have inheritance rights and/or receive social
security benefits as the dependent of the deceased—a request that is especially
54
prevalent in the United States.
The reasons for the national differences in judicial requests may be grounded in
the disparate legal regulations of assisted reproductive technologies in these
countries, as well as in their very different cultural understandings of procreation. In
the United States, where assisted reproductive technologies are lightly regulated,
decisions about harvesting gametes are often in the hands of medical ethics
committees. Once the request is approved, the decision of using these gametes for
the purpose of creating a child is further in the hands of private fertility clinics that
independently provide such services. Thus, for the most part, when courts are called
to respond to cases of posthumous conception the child already exists and the issue
at stake is mainly the relationship between the state and the child—especially the
privileges the child will receive. Similarly, in Japan, there is no regulatory
New Family Org. v. Rambam Med. Ctr. (2009) (Isr.) [hereinafter NFO]; Katy Sinclair, Israeli
Court Allows Use of Dead Soldier’s Sperm, BIONEWS (Jan.20, 2007), http://www.bionews.
org.uk/page_12974.asp; Andrew Vorzimer, Court Rules that Widow Can Use Dead
Husband’s Sperm, THE SPIN DOCTOR (May 24, 2011), http://www.eggdonor.com/blog/2011/
05/24/court-rules-widow-dead-husbands-sperm/; see also, Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (providing a U.S. decision); Ex parte Blood, [1997] EWCA
(Civ) 4003 (providing a U.K. decision).
52
Blood Claims IVF Paternity Victory, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/
2807707.stm (last updated Feb. 28, 2003); Neil Connor, Campaigner is Confident of Paternity
Declaration, THE BIRMINGHAM POST (Eng.), Mar. 1, 2003, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/
_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=98239278.
53

Takamatsu Kōtō Saibansho [Takamatsu High Court] July 16, 2004, Case to Seek
Acknowledgement, 2004 (Ju) No. 1748, 60 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHÜ [MINSHÜ] 7
(Japan); Noriyuki Ueda et al., Study of Views on Posthumous Reproduction, Focusing on Its
Relation with Views on Family and Religion in Modern Japan, 62 ACTA MED. OKAYAMA 285,
286. A few cases in Russia concern the registration of posthumously conceived children when
the grandmother requests registration. See From Sorrow to Surrogacy: Grandmother Fights
for Late Son’s Kids, RT NEWS (Russ.), June 7, 2011, http://rt.com/news/frozen-spermsurrogacy-maternity/; Irina Pulya, Posthumous Grandchildren, RUSSIA BEYOND THE
HEADLINES (Russ.), June 16, 2011, http://rbth.ru/articles/2011/06/16/posthumous_
grandchildren_13047.html.
54
In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1259-60 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000);
Woodward v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Mass. 2002); Khabbaz v. Comm’r,
Soc. Sec. Admin. 930 A.2d 1180, 1182 (N.H. 2007); Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 850
(Ark. 2008); Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 2004); Stephen v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In Re Martin B., 841
N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (Sur. Ct. 2007); Vernoff v. Astrue 568 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009);
Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 202526 (2012).
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framework of law or guidelines concerning assisted reproductive technologies, and
55
the actual procedure is in private hands. Judicial resolutions are therefore called for
only when the child exists. The focus on parentage acknowledgement and
registration further reflects the importance of the blood-line and family continuation
56
in Japanese culture.
The situation is different in countries which regulate assisted reproductive
technologies and allow posthumous conception. For instance, in Victoria, Australia
parental acknowledgement in the child’s birth certificate is part of the established
57
system, as it is in British Columbia, Canada, when the deceased was married or in
a marriage-like relationship and consented to the use of his or her gametes after
58
death. Following another suit by Diane Blood, in which it was accepted at the High
Court in London that the lack of such acknowledgment violated her children’s rights
59
to privacy and family life, the Parliament in the United Kingdom also revised the
60
regulation of parental registration. It subsequently adopted an amendment to the
Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990, in 2003 (now formally included in the
Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 2008) so that birth certificates for posthumously
conceived children would register the deceased as the father rather than leave the
61
line for the father’s name blank. The Act of 2008 further allows a woman who is in
62
a relationship with another woman to register as the other parent of a child. Thus,
in such countries, people seeking to harvest and subsequently use gametes must
approach the judiciary when there is a question of whether they have met the
threshold conditions, especially the consent of the deceased. Finally, the legal
framework in Israel also reflects the dilemmas being presented to courts. Although
there are no comprehensive national regulations about assisted reproductive
63
technologies, the national healthcare system offers fertility treatments. Moreover,
55
Mayumi Mayeda, Present State of Reproductive Medicine in Japan—Ethical Issues with
a Focus on Those Seen in Court Cases, 7 BMC MEDICAL ETHICS 2, 15 (2006).
56

Ueda, supra note 53, at 294.

57

Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) pt 5 (Austl.) (recognizing and
registering the deceased—whether a man or a woman in a heterosexual relationship, or a
woman in a same-sex relationship—as a parent of the posthumously conceived child).
58

Alberta Law Reform Inst., supra note 4, at 8–9.

59

Blood Claims IVF Paternity Victory, BBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2003), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/2807707.stm.
60
Clare Dyer, Diane Blood Law Victory Gives Her Sons Their 'Legal' Father, GUARDIAN,
Sep. 18, 2003, http://www.theguardian.com/science/2003/sep/19/genetics.uknews.
61

Human Fertilization and Embryology (Deceased Fathers) Bill, 2003, H.L. Bill [78] cl. 1
(U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldbills/078/03078.14.html. For the Parliamentary discussion on this amendment to the Act see 25 Apr. 2001,
PARL. DEB., H.C. Standing Committee G (2001) (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmstand/g/st010425/am/10425s01.htm; see also Fertilisation and
Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22, § 48 (U.K.).
62
63

Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 2008, c. 22, § 48 (U.K.).

Arich Raziel et al., Nationwide Use of Postmortem Retrieved Sperm in Israel: a Followup Report, 95 AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., 2693, 269395 (2011) (reporting that most of
the harvested gametes are ultimately not used however).

2014]

AN INTERNATIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE

41

the country’s cultural emphasis on procreation and “continuation of the family line,”
along with its mandatory military service, has created a greater acceptance of
64
posthumous conceptions. Consequently, in practice, requests for the harvesting or
use of sperm or eggs may often be resolved by turning to the state attorney; only a
65
handful of more controversial cases come to court.
The next Part considers the legal discourse on posthumously conceived children.
It observes the extent to which courts have addressed the welfare and best interests
of posthumously conceived children in their rulings, and analyzes the scope and
meaning of relevant decisions.
III. THE LEGAL DISCOURSE ON POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN
Regardless of the type of case that reaches court, it is pertinent to explore the
place posthumously conceived children occupy in judicial decisions. After all, the
goal of requests for harvesting gametes, or for the use of frozen ones, is to achieve a
pregnancy that will result in the birth of a child. In some cases, calculations of a
66
child’s welfare and best interests inherently fall into abstract thinking, but when a
fertility treatment has succeeded, and a child already exists, a case is necessarily
concrete. It would therefore be reasonable to expect that considerations of the
welfare and best interest of the posthumously conceived children will be part of the
discussion, just as in other cases concerning children in the family sphere.
This expectation is especially pertinent given the CRC’s requirement that states
attend to children’s interests and best interests. This international treaty, which
entered into force in 1991 and has been almost universally ratified (the exceptions
67
are the United States and Somalia),
aimed to create a children’s rights
68
revolution. Recognizing children as subjects and as bearers of rights, its provisions
are aimed at protecting the equal rights of all children up to the age of 18, regardless
69
of their race, religion, nationality, and importantly, also birth or other status.
Moreover, among its core provisions is the explicit requirement that, “In all actions
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
70
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.” Article 3(2) further requires
states “to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her
well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal
guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end,
64

Id. at 2694.

65

Telephone Interview with New Family Organization (Feb. 2013).

66

Pobjoy, supra note 6, at 459.

67

Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, ¶ 1577, Art. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/
44/a44r025.htm.
68

MAYA SABATELLO, CHILDREN’S BIOETHICS: THE INTERNATIONAL BIOPOLITCAL
DISCOURSE ON HARMFUL TRADITIONAL PRACTICES AND THE RIGHT OF THE CHILD TO CULTURAL
IDENTITY 2733 (2009) (describing the revolutionary and innovative provisions of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child).
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See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67.
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See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67, at Article 3(1).
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shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.” Thus, although
the CRC does not explicitly stipulate posthumously conceived children—indeed, it is
doubtful that at the time of its adoption, the drafters could possibly envision such
children—there can be no doubt that posthumously conceived children fall within
the CRC’s scope of protection.
Disturbingly, however, this is often not the case. An examination of judicial
decisions and media reports from various countries, including the United States,
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Russia, and Israel shows that
courts are overwhelmingly focused on the question of consent and the reproductive
72
73
freedom of the adults involved, on the property-like characteristics of gametes,
and on states’ interests in the orderly administration of estates and their intestate law,
74
as relevant for inheritance and social security benefits. In some instances, the
judicial neglect of children is more blatant. A decision by the Russian Civil Registry
75
Office is a vivid example. In this case, a woman who used the sperm of her dead
son to fertilize an egg from an anonymous donor and hired a surrogate to bear the
76
grandchild requested that the authorities issue a birth certificate. The authorities
refused, stating that the child was born two years after the death of the deceased;
they added that “because the egg donor was anonymous, the baby also does not have
77
a mother.” Consequently, the Civil Registry Office decided that “the baby has no
78
legal parents, does not officially exist, and cannot have a birth certificate.” Further,
71

See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67, at Article 3(2).

72

MAW v W. Sydney Area Health Serv. [2000] NSWSC 358; 49 NSWLR 23, ¶ 43
(Austl.); In the matter of Gray [2000] QSC 390, ¶ 23(a) (Austl.); R. v Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood, [1997] EWCA (Civ) 4003, [3][28], [1997] 2 WLR
806 (Q.B.D.) (Eng.); 13530/08 Family Court (Krayot), New Family Org. v. Rambam Med.
Ctr. (2009) ¶ 5.1 (Isr.).
73
Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); In the matter
of Gray [2000] QSC at ¶¶ 1122; Re H, AE (No 2) [2012] SASC 177, ¶¶ 4658 (Austl.);
Jocelyn Edwards; Re the estate of the late mark Edwards [2011] NSWSC 478, ¶¶ 4178
(Austl.); New Family Org., 13530/08 Family Court (Krayot) at ¶ 6.
74

Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 59799 (9th Cir. 2004); Vernoff v. Astrue
568 F.3d 1102, 111012 (9th Cir. 2009); Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 85254 (Ark.
2008); Woodward v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 272 (Mass. 2002); In re Certified
Question from the U.S. District Court, W.D. of Michigan, 825 N.W.2d 566, 570 (Mich. 2012);
Khabbaz v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin. 930 A.2d 1180, 118284 (N.H. 2007); Finley v.
Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 85254 (Ark. 2008).
75
A similar response is reported from a case delivered by the District Court in Russia. In
this case, a divorcee grandmother requested to be registered as the guardian of two pairs of
twins. See From Sorrow to Surrogacy, supra note 53; see also Pulya, supra note 53. The
children were conceived from her deceased son’s sperm and donated eggs and born through
two surrogates. See From Sorrow to Surrogacy, supra note 53; see also Pulya, supra note 53.
In denying her request, the court stated that, because under Russian law only married couples
can use surrogates “the four children five months old at the time have no legal mother and
father. . . .” See From Sorrow to Surrogacy, supra note 53; see also Pulya, supra note 53.
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according to the media report of the case, the Civil Registry Office suggested that the
grandmother “has no claim on the boy, and as she is too old to adopt him it wants to
79
take him away from her and place him in an orphanage.”
Clearly, such a response is astonishing. The child’s existence is not dependent on
any formal recognition of his or her parents. A child’s birth is an objective fact that,
under international law, states are required to document by issuing a birth
80
certificate. Further, even if a state may legitimately set an age limitation on
prospective parents who want to adopt a child, it is most likely that placing the child
in an orphanage will be a far worse option. In the particular instance of this case,
while it is unclear whether the fifty-five-year-old grandmother in fact requested to
adopt the child (as might be implied by the response of the Civil Registry Office),
there is no doubt that the child was very much wanted and taken care of, thus
undermining the rationales for placing the child in an orphanage—an option that is,
and must be, a last resort. And in any case, the child’s birth registration should
always be separate from the question of adoption. Simply stated, the position of the
Civil Registry Office could only have been made by entirely ignoring the child’s
interests.
Still, some exceptions merit attention. Specifically, nine judicial decisions have
raised the issue of child welfare and best interest in a substantive manner as a
consideration in decision-making. The first two cases addressed requests for the
81
harvesting of sperm. In MAW v. Western Sydney Area Health Services, heard by
the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Australia, the couple in question was
82
married for seven years when the husband was struck by a heavy vehicle. He was
subsequently admitted to the hospital where he was diagnosed as near brain dead and
83
put on life support. At the time that his wife filed the request with the court, his life
84
expectancy was estimated at approximately forty-eight hours. He was twenty-five
79

Leidig, supra note 20, at 627.

80

Article 7 of the CRC states:

1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from
birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and. as far as possible, the right to
know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with
their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in
this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67, at Art. 7; see also Convention on the
Rights of the Child, supra note 67, at Art. 8 (requiring states “to respect the right of the child
to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized
by law without unlawful interference.” Sub-Article (2) further stipulates that “[w]here a child
is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity, States Parties shall
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81
MAW v W. Sydney Area Health Serv. [2000] NSWSC 358; 49 NSWLR 231, ¶¶ 1, 9, 11
(Austl.).
82
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years old, the applicant was twenty-eight, and they did not yet have any children.
According to the records, the couple had originally decided to postpone parenthood
86
“until they got on their feet financially.” They further discussed having children
from time to time but put off the decision. A few months before the accident, the
husband discussed with his wife, in what was described as “a jocose way,” the
87
possibility of him having a vasectomy after making a semen donation. Although
the couple never pursued any course of action, these discussions were critical in the
88
court’s decision to dismiss her request; indeed, the applicant’s testimony that her
husband indicated “that if they were to have a child, he wanted the child to carry on
89
the W name” failed to persuade the court otherwise.
90
In the matter of Gray (heard by the Supreme Court of Queensland, Australia),
the couple had been married for six years, and had a one-year-old child, when the
thirty-seven-year-old husband died unexpectedly in his sleep. The applicant, who
was forty-two years old, submitted the request to harvest his sperm for the purpose
of procreation. She testified that they had discussed having another child and that
91
“their intentions [were] to do so in the near future.” As in the previous case, the
92
parents of the deceased supported the spouse’s request.
Although both cases were dismissed, essentially, on the grounds of lack of the
93
deceased’s consent to harvest his sperm, the courts raised the welfare and best
interests of prospective posthumously conceived children as well, as stated in the
MAW case, as “another factor militating against the recognition of such a new
94
special category.” In the case of MAW, the court explained that,
Such a child will never have the prospect of knowing his father. Such a
child would come to recognise that he or she was not sought to be
procreated during the life of the father. Such a child would not have rights
of succession. . . . Furthermore, should the circumstances of the child’s
conception come to be known there would be people in the community

85
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86
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87
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88
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MAW, [2000] NSWSC at ¶¶ 5, 7, 17-21, 24, 27-50, 51-62; see also In the matter of
Gray, [2000] QSC at ¶ 23(a) (resolving that in the lack of legislation, the court has no
jurisdiction). In both cases, the court also resolved that in the lack of legislation it has no
jurisdiction. MAW, [2000] NSWSC at ¶¶ 2750, as well as ¶¶ 5162; In the matter of Gray,
[2000] QSC at ¶¶ 5, 7, 24.
94

MAW, [2000] NSWSC at ¶ 43.
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who would tend to regard the child as different –not a happy situation,
95
especially for the child.
The court subsequently stated that “I cannot conclude that such a child’s best
interests would be served by being brought into existence in the manner, at the time
96
and in the circumstances contemplated as possible by the plaintiff.”
Similarly, In the matter of Gray the court opined, in regard to the harvesting
request, that,
I cannot see how it can be said that the interests of such a child will be
advanced by inevitable fatherlessness. The very nature of the conception
may cause the child embarrassment or more serious emotional problems
as it grows up. More significantly, because the court can never know in
what circumstances the child may be born and brought up, it is impossible
97
to know what is in its best interests.
Subsequently, the court concluded that this case did not raise legal “challenges for
which there may be no adequate precedent,” that “good sense and ordinary concepts
of morality should be a sufficient guide for many of the problems that will arise
[with the expansion of medical technology],” and that if these are insufficient, it
98
should be left to the legislator to provide another legal response.
99
The third case was heard by the High Court of Japan in 2004. This case
involved the request of a widow that her dead husband be acknowledged as the
father of her posthumously conceived child, born eighteen months after the father’s
100
death.
In this case, the husband had preserved sperm while going through cancer
treatment, and the couple was in the process of getting an approval for IVF when he
101
died.
The deceased’s consent was not contested, and his parents were also fully
involved and supported the widow’s decision to continue the IVF treatment after he
102
died.
However, reversing the decision of the lower court, the Japanese High Court
103
dismissed the request.
While it did so presumably on the ground of lack of
104
legislation,
it highlighted considerations relating to the child as well. The court
ruled that it is impossible to establish a parent-child relationship in such scenario
95
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because there is no possibility for the father to have parental authority over the child;
nor is it possible for the child to enjoy the father’s custody, care, or support; nor
105
could the child become the father’s heir.
In concurring opinions, other justices
provided additional justifications. They emphasized that the existence of a “blood
relationship” cannot necessarily be a reason to legally recognize parent-child
relations, stating that, in general, a child is born with both father and mother being
alive who provide him or her the environment in which they mentally or materially
106
bless him or her.
Moreover, while Justice Imai Isao pointed out that the court
should consider the existing child, and that “there should be no objection to giving
priority to the welfare of the child,” he nonetheless found the benefits of registration
107
insignificant —even though it was explicitly acknowledged that leaving a blank in
the section for father in the family register causes considerable social disadvantages
108
to the child,
and despite the indisputable benefit of registration in that it would
enable the child to claim kinship with the father’s relatives, including possible rights
109
and obligations of support between them.
In three other cases concerning inheritance and the social benefit rights of
posthumously conceived children, all heard by courts in the United States, the judges
considered the welfare and best interests of the child. In the case of Lauren
110
Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security,
a widow asked the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts to rule on whether twin girls born following her use
of her deceased husband’s sperm were eligible for inheritance and social security
benefits under Massachusetts’ intestacy law. The husband had deposited sperm just
before entering medical treatment for leukemia; the twins were born two years after
111
his death. While the Court generally accepted that interpretation of Massachusetts
law allows posthumously conceived children to inherit and receive social security
benefits, it did not decide the particular case, remanding it to the Probate and Family
Court for further evidence concerning the deceased’s explicit consent to both the use
112
of his sperm after his death and to support the resulting child.
Its opinion on
posthumously conceived children is yet important.
In its decision, the Court stipulated state interests that need to be balanced: the
child’s best interests, the state’s interest in the orderly administration of estates, and
113
the reproductive rights of the genetic parent.
Importantly, the Court emphasized
105
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Id. at ¶ 2.
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Id. at ¶ ¶ 45.
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Id. at ¶ 3 (explicitly acknowledging that “the family register in Japan is an important
system that has no equivalent in other countries, and a blank in section of father in the family
register causes considerable social disadvantages to the child.”).
109

Id. at ¶ 5.
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Woodward v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002).
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Id. at 260.
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Id. at 272. The Court stipulated a two-fold consent requirement from the deceased:
consent that his gamete is used for procreation after his death (a genetic-biological
connection) and consent to the support of any resulting child. Id. The Court was not persuaded
that the latter existed. Id.
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Id.at 265.
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the overriding legislative concern to protect minor children, “most especially those
114
who may be stigmatized by their ‘illegitimate’ status,”
including posthumously
conceived children within the scope of this protection. The Court highlighted that the
115
legislature encouraged assisted reproductive technologies
and that it would
therefore be inconsistent and irrational to suggest that children resulting from such
116
technologies have fewer rights and protections than other children.
The Court
further stated unequivocally that “posthumously conceived children may not come
into the world the way the majority children do, but they are children
117
nonetheless.”
The Court thus concluded that, generally, they are “entitled, in so
far as possible, to the same rights and protections of law” as children conceived
118
before death.
119
In Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart,
the United States Ninth Appellate Circuit
accepted the plaintiff-appellant’s assertion that her minor children, conceived after
the death of her husband, were entitled to insurance benefits under Arizona law. In
this case, the deceased deposited sperm before undergoing chemotherapy for cancer,
and there was no dispute as to his wish that his widow have their child after his
120
death.
In reaching its conclusion, the court took a broad interpretive approach to
the criteria of the Social Security Act. It stated that once the parentage question is
undisputed, as in the present case, the requirement of proving dependency should be
121
automatically interpreted as inherently inclusive of all legitimate children. As the
court emphasized,
It has long been the policy of the state to protect innocent children from
the omissions of their parents by abolishing legal distinctions based on
legitimacy . . . Although Arizona law does not deal specifically with
posthumously conceived children, every child in Arizona, which
necessarily includes Juliet and Piers [the children of the deceased], is the
122
legitimate child of her or his natural parents.
A similar conclusion was reached by the Surrogate’s Court of New York. In In
the Matter of the Construction of Agreements among Martin B., as Grantor, and
123
Martin B. et al, as Trustees,
the court resolved that two infants conceived by the
widow after the deceased’s death were “issue” of “descendants” protected under the
114

Id.

115
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116
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trust fund. While the court acknowledged that “certainty and finality are critical to
the public interests in the orderly administration of estates,” it also highlighted that
“the human desire to have children, albeit by biotechnology, deserves respect, as do
124
the rights of the children born as a result of such scientific advances.”
Further, it
emphasized that “if an individual considers a child to be his or her own, society
through its laws should do so as well,” leading to its conclusion that the two
posthumously conceived children should be treated as part of their father’s family
125
for all purposes.
As the court stipulated, “where a governing instrument is silent,
children born of this new biotechnology with the consent of their parent are entitled
126
to the same rights “for all purposes as those of a natural child.”
A seventh relevant case, New Family Organization et al v. Rambam Medical
127
Center et al
was delivered by the Family Court Hakrayot in 2009. In this case, a
forty-year-old single woman requested the court’s permission to use the sperm of a
man who died at twenty-two after preserving his sperm when he received treatment
128
for cancer.
According to his parents, he expressed a desire for them to have his
129
grandchildren with his sperm.
Although the woman never knew the man or his
family, the family fully supported her request to be impregnated with their son’s
130
sperm.
The parents of the deceased and the woman also signed an agreement to
131
regulate their relationships.
In approving the request, the court gave the most comprehensive examination to
date of the welfare and best interests of the child. The court acknowledged some
general concerns about the unique family structure and its possible financial impact
132
given that the child will be raised in a single-parent household.
It also noted the
133
possibility of the child experiencing some identity issues.
However, it ultimately
emphasized that the decision has to take into account the specific facts of the
134
case.
Accordingly, it observed that a single-mother is not uncommon, while
simultaneously pointing out that, in the present case, the family will already have an
135
untraditional structure.
The court noted that in the particular case, the applicant’s
only alternative to posthumous conception from this known deceased would be
136
conception through the use of sperm from an unknown donor.
Given these
124

Id. at 211.
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circumstances, the court raised the medical, psychological, and religious benefits of
the child knowing his genetic origins and emphasized the right of the child to enjoy
137
extended family relations of both parents as rationales for its decision.
Finally, two additional cases from Australia considered the issues of child
welfare and the child’s best interests in a substantial way: the Jocelyn Edwards
138
case from the Supreme Court in New South Wales (May 2011) and Re H, AE (No
139
2)
from the Supreme Court of South Australia (October 2012). Both cases
addressed whether a widow is entitled to possession of sperm that had been extracted
from the widow’s dead husband. The extended families in both cases were also
involved and supportive of the possibility of having a posthumously conceived
grandchild. In the Edwards case, the couple had been married for five years, both
individuals had children from previous relationships, and they were going through
140
fertility treatment when the husband was fatally injured in a workplace accident.
The applicant, forty years old at the time of her husband’s death, further testified that
when her husband had earlier experienced severe back pain and was being diagnosed
for his condition, he explicitly said that,
If something happens to me I would want a part of me to be here with
you. Our baby will be a part of us—our legacy even after we are both
gone. She will be the bond that unites our families. The bond between
[their two children]. If we find out I have cancer I want to make sure we
have our baby before I am unable to have one, before I do any chemo.
141
Please promise me you will still have our baby.
In Re H, AE (No 2) case, the husband died as a result of a motor vehicle
142
accident.
The couple had been married at the time for just over a year, although
143
they had also been domestic partners for five years prior to that.
They were
attempting to start a family. The deceased left a will making the applicant the
144
residuary beneficiary of his estate.
Shortly after his death, the applicant, twenty
145
years old at the time, filed a request that doctors harvest the husband’s sperm. The
court approved the request due to the urgency of the situation, with the condition that
146
the sperm will not be used for any purpose without another order of the court.

137
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Five months later, the widow sought a declaration that she was entitled to possession
147
of the sperm and an order for its release to her.
In contrast to the MAW and Gray cases, the Edwards and the Re H, AE (No. 2)
courts approved the requests. In considering the child’s welfare and best interests,
the courts emphasized the characteristics of the wife and the wider family support
that would further ensure the child would be provided with the needed material
148
support.
The Edwards court, beyond finding that the child would be born to a
loving mother and a supportive extended family, ultimately stated that “it would be
149
inappropriate to engage in speculation about a variety of indeterminable matters”
such as the wife’s future health, her employment and financial situation, or whether
150
she would remarry.
There are various reasons why courts granted the question of the welfare and best
interests of posthumously conceived children greater attention in these recent cases.
Changes in the family and family structures, especially but not only due to the
availability of assisted reproductive technologies, have meant that the single-parent
151
household is not abnormal in many societies as it was historically perceived to be.
The scope of the phenomenon of posthumously conceived children may further
explain this shift. Certainly, it is not as common as other reproductive procedures
such as IVF, surrogacy, or gamete donation. However, the number of requests for
152
posthumous conception has significantly increased in the past decade,
leading
147

Id.

148

Jocelyn Edwards; Re the estate of the late Mark Edwards [2011] NSWSC 478 (Austl.).
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Id. at ¶ 144.
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Id. at ¶ 143. See in this regard also Re H, AE [2012] SASC 146, ¶ 37 (Austl.)
(discussing various possible scenarios for a child to be born when the father is not present and
changes in family structure, concluding that “[i]t cannot be thought that because the child will
only have one living parent that will necessarily not be in its best interests, particularly when
the alternative is for the child not to exist at all.”).
151

Joanna L. Grossman, A Growing Debate Over the Rights of Posthumously Conceived
Children: Part One in a Two-Part Series of Columns, VERDICT (Sept. 6, 2011),
http://verdict.justia.com/2011/09/06/a-growing-debate-over-the-rights-of-posthumouslyconceived-children (stating that, according to reports, forty-one percent of all American
children were born to unmarried parents in 2011, and twenty-five percent of same-sex couple
households included children).
152

There is no accurate data as to how many posthumously conceived children have been
born. However, there is no doubt that the number is rising. Laura Dwyer, Dead Daddies:
Issues in Postmortem Reproduction, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 881, 910 (2000) (stating that
according to a study by the University of Pennsylvania, in the years from 1980 to 1995,
eighty-two requests were made at infertility clinics for post-mortem gamete retrieval and
unitization); Kimberly E. Naguit, The Inadequacies of Missouri Intestacy Law: Addressing the
Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 74 MO. L. REV. 889, 889 n.5 (2009) (stating that
in the United States, it was estimated as of 2003 that there are hundreds of thousands of
cryopreserved embryos that exist not least because of the number of American soldiers who
are active in war); See also Katz, supra note 13, at 294 (stating that “the fact is that requests
[for post-mortem gamete retrieval and unitization] are numerous, they appear on a worldwide
basis, and their number is expected to grow”); Blood Claims IVF Paternity Victory, BBC
NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/2807707.stm (last updated Feb. 28, 2003) (in the UK,
it was estimated that in 2003 the number of posthumously conceived children was between
forty and fifty).
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also to a shift in the societal acceptance of such children. Indeed, recent studies of
public opinion on this issue in both the United States and Japan show significant
153
support (about 5078% and 60%, respectively).
Finally, the rise of the children’s
rights agenda, especially in the past decade, has played a role in this acceptance. As
154
states are gradually internalizing their responsibilities under the CRC,
courts all
around the world are increasingly considering how their decisions affect the welfare
and best interests of the child at stake. Moreover, the simultaneous rise of internet
155
communication and globalization has created an additional international pressure.
They make injustices towards such children public and call for remedial measures.
Notwithstanding these discussions, the scope of these judicial decisions is
limited, and a few observations are in place. First, these rulings are local and
commonly not comprehensive. The rights granted to a posthumously conceived child
are dependent on the child’s place of birth—be it Japan, Australia, or Israel—or
156
even, in light of the Capato case in the United States, on the particular state.
Moreover, even if courts are willing to acknowledge the familial surroundings of
posthumously conceived children (as in the NFO, Edwards, and Re H, AE cases),
they commonly deny those children inheritance and social benefit rights. The United
States Supreme Court decision in Capato is illustrative in this regard. Whereas the
Court refrained from any explicit and particular discussion about the twins’ welfare
and best interests, its determination that the aim of the Social Security Act “was not
to create a program ‘generally benefiting needy persons’ . . . [but] to ‘provide . . .
dependent members of [a wage earner’s] family with protection against the hardship
occasioned by [the] loss of [the insured’s] earnings,’” led it to conclude that
157
inheritance rights are to be determined by states’ intestacy laws.
And while the
United States Supreme Court acknowledged that states adopt different intestacy laws
with regard to posthumously conceived children, it rejected the argument that
153

Sara E. Barton et al., Population-based Study of Attitudes Toward Posthumous
Reproduction, 98 FERTILITY & STERILITY 735, 73540 (2012); Gary S. Nakhuda et al.,
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& STERILITY 2693, 2693 (2011) (stating that the actual use of extracted sperm may be low);
see also Devon D. Williams, Over My Dead Body: The Legal Nightmare and Medical
Phenomenon of Posthumous Conception Through Postmortem Sperm Retrieval, 34 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 181, 19899 (2011) (stating that public support for posthumous conception may be
dependent on factors such as marital status of the couple and the support of the deceased’s
family—regardless of the deceased’s consent).
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heightened scrutiny is appropriate in the case, stating that “no showing has been
made that posthumously conceived children share the characteristics that prompted
158
our skepticism of classifications disadvantaging children of unwed parents.”
Concurrently, the lessons that can be learnt from court cases where inheritance
and social benefits for posthumously conceived children were granted are equally
limited. While in In the Matter of Martin B., the court upheld the interests of the
posthumously conceived children, the application in front of it merely required its
confirmation of what was agreed upon by all parties rather than a resolution of a
159
dispute. Conversely, in the Woodward case, the Court’s two-fold expectation that
a deceased parent should explicitly consent to both the use of his sperm after his
160
death and to support the resulting child
may be too demanding given that it was
not previously required. Despite the judicial statements of protecting the interests
and rights of posthumously conceived children, then, the Court, in effect, erected a
barrier that, in the present case, may be impossible to overcome. Further, it may be
punishing posthumously conceived children for the failure of their parents’ to plan
161
appropriately for an unknown possible future —an undesirable result.
Certainly, the lack of clear legislative statement about the rights of posthumously
conceived children may reflect the common phenomenon that the legal system is not
yet up to date with the developments of medical technologies. This problem is
especially pertinent in the case of assisted reproductive technologies, not least
162
because ensuing disagreements often lead to a legislative block.
Yet while courts
may be reluctant to interfere in the enactment of laws as a matter of separation of
powers (indeed, this was also the formal justification for the decision of the Japanese
163
Supreme Court),
it is disturbing that the only victims of this lack of regulations
are the children.
A second observation is that judicial determination in each of these cases coupled
the question of the child’s welfare and best interests with the courts’ perception—
and judgmental view—of the wife/future mother. In the MAW case, where the
request was for the harvesting of sperm, the court interpreted the wife’s admission
that she is emotional and that she would wait a few months before she makes a final
decision about whether to proceed with using the sperm to mean that she blames
158
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164

herself for not having a child while her husband was well
and that she should not
165
make decisions at all.
Moreover, it interpreted her admission that bearing and
caring for a child is time consuming and demanding as a sign that once the emotional
166
crisis subsides “she is quite likely to change her mind about having a child.”
Similarly, In the matter of Gray, the Court stipulated that given the wife’s grief and
shock from the unexpected death of her husband “[it] could have no confidence that
167
the applicant’s desire is a result of careful or rational deliberation.”
And in the
Japanese case, the traditional conceptualization of the family as an institution that is
associated directly with being a husband and wife seemingly led to judicial disdain
168
of a single-mother household.
Thus, although that court was correct that in
general a child is born with both father and mother being alive, its refusal to do
justice with a “different” family sends the practical message that maternal authority
169
is not enough—even when supported by the extended family.
These judicial conclusions are logically peculiar. In MAW, it would have been
wrong if the applicant was not emotional after losing her life partner, there is no
doubt that child rearing is indeed demanding, and beyond anything else, her
admission that she would wait before proceeding with using the sperm shows
maternal responsibility (and certainly not guilt). Further, it is not at all clear why
one’s (reasonably) emotional state should undermine rational thinking, as suggested
by both the MAW and the Gray courts. Even if the women’s current state is
emotional, it is further unclear why that justifies denying these women the
opportunity for future careful and rational deliberation. The decisions are thus overly
paternalistic. Similarly, in the Japanese case, although the child was already born,
Justice Shigeo highlights that “it is still necessary to fully consider whether or not it
is appropriate at all to give birth to such a child based on the sperm donor’s living
170
consent”
—implying that the mother’s decision to do so was simply wrong. As
the courts are dismissive of the wives as competent decision-makers and as future
good mothers, they deny the requests as though the decisions are grounded in the
child’s best interests.
Moreover, the decisions come across as merely reflecting the Justices’ personal
opposing view rather than being grounded in law. Although the Japanese Court
admits that the Civil Code that regulates parental acknowledgement was enacted in
164
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165
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the pre-assisted reproductive technologies era and that it should be extended beyond
natural reproduction, Justice Shigeo views posthumously conceived children as
171
“contrary to the providence of nature” which justifies, in his mind, the rejection of
the application. The judicial disdain is most vivid in the MAW case: Justice O'Keefe
went as far as to compare the cases of posthumously conceived children with the
highly controversial question of the abortion of fetuses conceived by persons with
172
developmental and mental disability or communicable diseases.
Thus, not only
did the Court strip away any agency that these women had as human beings, but it
173
also implied that this “special new category” of posthumously conceived children
is akin to a communicable disease and polluting of the social fabric.
In contrast, in the more recent cases from Australia and Israel (the NFO,
Edwards, and Re H, AE cases), the courts’ perception of the future mothers as
174
loving, caring, and responsible set the tone for its subsequent observation that the
support of their extended families is instrumental to the child’s development and
sense of security. Certainly, the time at which the various rulings were delivered may
account for at least some of the difference. Single parent household today are
175
significantly more prevalent and socially accepted than they were a decade ago,
and it is possible that those judicial decisions simply mirror the societal shift. It may
also be the case that the characteristics of the individual applicants in the various
cases are what mobilized each court’s ruling. While this is not obvious from the facts
of the cases, it is reasonable to suspect that the women in the Edwards and Re H, AE
(No 2) cases were indeed less visibly emotional given the time that had passed since
the deaths of their husbands (and the subsequent extraction of their sperm) and the
176
time at which they requested to receive possession of the gamete.
It is worth
noting that the courts’ initial denial of the wives’ requests to extract sperm in the
MAW and Gray cases also denied those wives the opportunity to overcome their
initial grief.
The third observation is that, generally, the courts upheld traditional family
structure comprised of a man and a woman who are alive— a position that implicitly
undermines, rather than endorses, the new families in which these children are
raised. The judicial comments in this regard were most obvious in the MAW and
171
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Gray cases, as well as in the Japanese case, where the courts explicitly emphasized
the traditional marital relationship of a father and a mother at the time of conception
177
as a central point. But, a similar result can be observed in the cases that approved
the requests (even if unintentionally). In the NFO case, the explicit comparison with
178
the known sperm donor
reinforces the traditional conceptualization of the family
unit and the importance attributed to the genetic—rather than social—tie. This
emphasis implicitly undermines many of the new families that were created through
the use of gamete donation. Further, the courts in all three cases—the New Family
Organization, Edwards and Re H, AE (No. 2)—note that a single-mother household
is an untraditional family structure and pay great importance to the material and
179
other support that the parents of both the widow and the deceased will provide.
This too reflects the expectation of a traditional extended family.
To be sure, there is nothing inherently wrong in bringing the extended family
into consideration. Indeed, from a child-centered perspective there is little doubt that
such relationships are important. The concern is, however, that the more that the
courts ground the welfare and best interests of posthumously conceived children in
the extension of the traditional family of one mother and one father, the harder it will
be for posthumously conceived children who are born in the other scenarios sketched
earlier—especially, families of more than two parents (as in the instance of the
husband and frozen embryo from first wife) or of same-sex couples—to have their
180
needs properly addressed and endorsed.
And again, in so far that children should
not pay the price of decisions made by their parents, it is important that in the future
judicial rationales are sufficiently inclusive to cover these other scenarios as well.
Finally, the courts’ use of terminology of welfare and best interests of the child
does not necessarily mean that the judicial decision was in fact mobilized by any
objective criteria of what the child’s welfare and best interests actually are. As the
discussion of the judicial decisions shows, the courts have used the terminology of
child welfare and best interests both to dismiss and to accept the requests made of
181
it.
The (bizarre) comment by the Gray Court in justifying its rejection of the
182
request (that “it is impossible to know what is in [the child’s] best interests” )
especially reflects this manipulation of the concept of the child’s best interests. It
shows, not only that determination of the child’s best interest is a regular, common,
and indeed, expected part of the court’s decision, but also, this is in fact exactly what
the court did in arriving at its decision. Furthermore, with the exception of the Israeli
183
Court in the NFO case, none of the other Justices referred to any empirical studies
177

See supra Part III.

178

13530/08 Family Court (Krayot), New Family Org. v. Rambam Med. Ctr. (2009) ¶ 5.2

(Isr.).
179

See supra Part III.

180

See supra Part I.

181
Interestingly, although the Gillett-Netting court was especially supportive of protecting
the rights and interests of posthumously conceived children, the decision does not include an
explicit mention of the child welfare and best interests. See Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371
F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).
182

In the matter of Gray [2000] QSC 390, ¶ 23(c) (Austl.).

183

New Family Org., 13530/08 Family Court (Krayot) at ¶ 5.2.
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in support of their opinion. Quite the contrary, in the Japanese case, when a child
already existed and the justices were aware of the considerable negative impact the
lack of paternity registration would have on the child given the unique importance
attributed to the family registry in Japan, they nonetheless opted to reject the
184
registration request.
The vagueness of the concepts of child welfare and best interests may partially
explain why courts can use these concepts to support whichever position each is
inclined to adopt. This criticism is not new. Scholars have long charged that these
185
concepts are too elastic, too open for abuse; and, to an extent, it is certainly true.
But as other alternative standards do not yet exist, the focus should be on how the
186
flawed implementation of this measure can be improved.
One such way, I
suggest, is to consider whether the arguments raised correspond with children’s own
views of their needs. Put differently, by listening to children’s experiences—as also
187
required under the CRC —the court can enrich the debate and inform the legal
policies to be adopted. The next part considers the rights at stake of posthumously
conceived children as judicial decisions have raised them and considers children’s
perspectives thereof.
IV. POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN
Judicial decisions concerning posthumous conception and scholarly work in their
arena raise four main interests and rights of the resulting children: parentage
acknowledgment, family structure, identity harm, and finally, inheritance and social
benefits. Each of these is discussed separately below.
A. Parentage Acknowledgement
Should parentage acknowledgement of the deceased parent be established in the
case of posthumously conceived children? In discussing this issue, courts have
generally regarded biology, that is, whether there is a genetic or “blood” connection
between the posthumously conceived children and the deceased, as a precondition
188
for registration of parenthood. Additional requirements revolve around consent of
the deceased (United States, Australia) or valid marriage (some states in the United
189
States, Japan).

184

See Takamatsu Kōtō Saibansho [Takamatsu High Court] July 16, 2004, Case to Seek
Acknowledgement, 2004 (Ju) No. 1748, 60 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHÜ [MINSHÜ] 7,
¶ 3 (Japan).
185
SABATELLO, supra note 68, at 12027, 199. See Pobjoy, supra note 6, at 459; Kimberly
M. Mutcherson, In Defense of Future Children: A Response to Cohen’s Beyond Best Interests,
96 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 46, 5764 (2012).
186

See Mutcherson, supra note 185, at 61.

187

See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67, at Art. 12.

188

Case to Seek Acknowledgement, 60 MINSHÜ 7 at ¶ 3; In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d
1257, 125859 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000); Woodward v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d
257, 272 (Mass. 2002); Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 59899 (9th Cir.).
189
Contra Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598 (ruling that posthumously conceived children
are legitimate children of the deceased as under Arizona law “every child is the legitimate
child of its natural parents and is entitled to support . . . as if born in lawful wedlock.” Here

2014]

AN INTERNATIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE

57

These conditions require further consideration. On the one hand, unwed genetic
fathers who were tricked into having a child cannot prevent their parentage
190
acknowledgement. This suggests that genetics, rather than consent or marriage, is
191
the paramount aspect for parentage.
On the other hand, familial relations often
trump genetics. Indeed, in Western legal structure, including the United States, the
bond between biological parenthood (particularly fatherhood) and parental-child
192
acknowledgement was never a “natural given” but a social construct. One glaring
example is the so-called presumption of paternity, a legal construct whereby it is
assumed that the husband is the father of a child born into the marriage—although
the number of children who are unknowingly raised by non-genetically related
fathers is not marginal. In the United States, this number is estimated at one out of
ten children born to a marriage; this number increases to one out of seven in the
193
United Kingdom.
Children’s perspectives support the approach of social parenthood. Studies show
that for children, especially in families that became possible with the developments
of assisted reproductive technologies, genetics is not paramount; children determine
parentage by the way in which they were raised, and especially, the fact that they
194
were planned and wanted all along.
These criteria can hardly be contested in the
too there was evidence, however, for the deceased husband’s consent for the posthumously
conceived children.).
190

Paternity Fraud Rampant in the US, WND.COM (Feb. 18, 2006), http://www.wnd.com/
2006/02/34861 (Media reports and organizations dedicated to revealing “paternity fraud”
estimate the rate at from fourteen percent to as high as thirty percent); See also
PATERNITYFRAUD.COM, www.paternityfraud.com (last visited Jan. 4, 2014).
191

See Ruth Zafran, Dying to Be A Father: Legal Paternity in Cases of Posthumous
Conception, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 47, 7174 (2007) (discussing the “genetic
model”).
192

Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 25357 (1995); see also
Simpson, supra note 14, at 9.
193

Jane Alfred, Flagging Non-Paternity, 3 NATURE REV. GENETICS 161, 161 (2002). It is
difficult to know whether this rate is accurate. The American Association of Blood Banks, the
only organization in the US to collect information about relationship genetic testing from
approved laboratories, suggests in its 2010 annual report (the latest available) that the average
exclusion rate of paternal relationships is 20.44% with a standard deviation of 6.62.
RELATIONSHIP TESTING PROGRAM UNIT, AABB, ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY FOR TESTING IN
2010 3 (2010), available at http://www.aabb.org/sa/facilities/Documents/rtannrpt10.pdf.
However, this percentage includes testing following a mother’s request to determine who
among a few possible men is the father; it also includes testing after the recognized man raises
a question of infidelity, after which a few other possible men are tested, leading the
organization to conclude that “[t]here is no evidence that a large number of the men excluded
in the testing were misled into believing they are the biological father of a given child.” Id. at
4; See also Kermyt G. Anderson, How Well Does Paternity Confidence Match Actual
Paternity? Evidence from Worldwide Paternity Rates, 47 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 513, 515
(2006); S. Macintyre & A. Sooman, Non-Paternity and Prenatal Genetic Screening, 338
LANCET 869, 86970 (1991).
194

José Gabilondo, Heterosexuality as a Prenatal Social Problem: Why Parents and
Courts Have a Taste for Heterosexuality, in BABY MARKETS: MONEY AND THE NEW POLITICS
OF CREATING FAMILIES 118, 124, 129 n.43 (Michele B. Goodwin ed., 2010); Susan Golombok,
et al., Families Created by the New Reproductive Technologies: Quality of Parenting and
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case of posthumously conceived children, especially when the deceased has clearly
provided consent. Thus, from a child’s perspective, judicial decisions denying
parentage acknowledgement is the worst of all worlds. Such decisions lean on
genetics, which is not as relevant for children and which would exclude
posthumously conceived children born to non-traditional family structures from
having an established parentage. Simultaneously, they do not take seriously
children’s emphasis on the importance of their parentage relationships, which
children construe as a matter of being planned and wanted.
A more responsive approach would be to enable acknowledgment of the parental
status of deceased spouses—even if such registration would not change the ensuing
195
inheritance rights.
Such acknowledgement is especially appropriate given that
such children are likely to know their story of conception and to inquire, and hear
196
about, their genetic parents.
Indeed, studies on the process of grief and mourning
suggest that in reality the dead continue to occupy a significant social and domestic
space; in both traditional and Western societies, “the living continue to be in
197
dialogical contact with the dead.”
Parentage acknowledgement would also
correspond better with states’ international obligations under international law.
Articles 7 and 8 of the CRC explicitly require that regardless of status, a child is
“registered immediately after birth, along with a right to a name and the right to
198
preserve his or her identity, including name and family relations. Moreover, as the
High Court in London declared in its judicial resolution of Ms. Blood’s second suit
requesting parental registration, registering children born posthumously to a woman
from the sperm of her deceased husband as fatherless, was contrary to the right to
privacy and family life, as well as the right to found a family under Articles 8 and 12
199
of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
Parental acknowledgement and registration will at least narrow the child’s familial
dissonance.
B. Family Structures
Another domain of legal argument over posthumously conceived children is
family structure. Specifically, scholars and judicial opinions have argued that
because a widow inherently acts out of sorrow and grief, she will not be able to
Social and Emotional Development of the Children, 66 CHILD DEV. 285, 297 (1995); Dena
Moyal & Carolyn Shelly, Future Child’s Rights in New Reproductive Technology: Thinking
Outside the Tube and Maintaining the Connections, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 431, 433 (2010); Zaira
Papaligoura & Colwyn Trevarthen, Mother-Infant Communication Can be Enhanced after
Conception by In-Vitro Fertilization, 22 INFANT MENTAL HEALTH J. 591, 591 (2001).
195
See discussion infra Part IV(d). Yet, as argued below, I suggest that posthumously
conceived children should be eligible also for the inheritance and social benefits. See
discussion infra Part IV(d).
196

Pobjoy, supra note 6, at 46263.

197

Simpson, supra note 14, at 12; see also Ueda et al., supra note 53, at 29495 (discussing
the support for posthumous conception among Japanese students because of “intimacy across
the border between life and death” and the Japanese views on afterlife).
198
199

Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67, at Art. 78.

See 25 Apr. 2001, PARL. DEB., H.C. Standing Committee G (2001) (U.K.), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmstand/g/st010425/am/10425s01.htm.
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200

provide a child with a stable and loving environment.
They have also suggested
that growing up with both parents is preferable to growing up in a single-parent
201
household,
not least because of possible financial hardship and the effects of
202
poverty on the child’s development.
Others have further stressed the negative
psychological impact that such a non-traditional conception story might have on a
child (as has been documented with children who were orphaned before knowing
their parent) and charge that it is simply wrong to bring into the world a parent-less
203
child.
Although these arguments seemingly aim to advance children’s interests, caution
is needed. First, from a legal standpoint, the presumption of a universal, ultimate
family structure for the child cannot hold. While the CRC pays great attention to the
importance of the familial environment to the child, it does not limit the definition of
204
the family to the traditional structure of a mother and a father.
Rather, it allows
for pluralism in family relations, requiring states to “respect the responsibilities,
rights and duties of parents or, where applicable, the members of the extended family
205
or community . . . .” Second, worry over possible financial hardship cannot justify
an automatic dismissal of requests for posthumous conception. At least some single
206
parents can certainly provide a comfortable economic environment for the child,
and the practice of relying on assistance (financial and other) from extended family
varies across cultures. In contrast to American and German individualist cultures,
200
Sorin Hostiuc & Christian George Curca, Informed Consent in Posthumous Sperm
Procurement, 282 ARCHIVES GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 433, 436 (2010); Hunfeld et al.,
supra note 28, at 284; Katz, supra note 13, at 30910; see also MAW v W. Sydney Area Health
Serv. [2000] NSWC 358; 49 NSWLR 231 (Austl.); In the matter of Gray [2000] QSC 390, ¶
23 (Austl.); supra Part III.
201

See Takamatsu Kōtō Saibansho [Takamatsu High Court] July 16, 2004, Case to Seek
Acknowledgement, 2004 (Ju) No. 1748, 60 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHÜ [MINSHÜ] 7
(Japan).
202

Fiona MacCallum & Susan Golombok, Children Raised in Fatherless Families from
Infancy: A Follow-up of Children of Lesbian and Single Heterosexual Mothers at Early
Adolescence, 48 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 1407, 1407 (2004); Williams, supra note
153, at 195.
203

Ruth Landau, Posthumous Sperm Retrieval for the Purpose of Later Insemination or
IVF in Israel: An Ethical and Psychological Critique, 19 HUM. REPROD. 1952, 1953 (2004);
Hostiuc & Curca, supra note 200, at 436; Antall, supra note 29, at 22021. See also Case to
Seek Acknowledgement, 60 MINSHÜ 7.
204

Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67, at pmbl., Arts. 23, 5, 710, 14,
16, 18, 2023; Sabatello, supra note 30, at 82; see also Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021,
2030 (2012); Pobjoy, supra note 6, at 464 (making a similar point).
205
206

See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67, at Art. 5.

Given the expenses associated with assisted reproductive technologies in the US and
Japan (unlike some other countries where such services are provided by the national
healthcare system), it is also likely that low-income women will not have access to such
procedures. Mayeda, supra note 55, at 15; Williams, supra note 153, at 195; see also From
Sorrow to Surrogacy, supra note 53; Pulya, supra note 53. The children born to the
grandmother who used her son’s sperm through two surrogates were cared for by the
grandmother, her sister and a nanny. Pulya, supra note 53.
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Israeli society, for instance, sees none of the family members as truly independent.
The child and the future child are seen as part of a collective whole, characterized by
207
mutual dependence and with duties and responsibilities towards one another.
Similarly, in cases where a child’s father dies young, Iran’s civil law transfers the
208
responsibility for the child to the grandfather or uncle,
suggesting that the
extended family is invested in each child. Moreover, familial circumstances and
subsequent financial improvement or hardship may occur in all kinds of families.
For instance, divorcing parents (especially mothers) often experience a drop in
209
financial stability and resources.
By the same token, a surviving parent may well
develop a new, more profitable, career path, or find another life partner—scenarios
that are likely to improve the financial situation of the family unit. Discerning
beforehand what the economic environment will be is thus often mere guesswork.
Besides, as Justice Alon stated in NFO, many children are born into difficult
conditions even when they have a traditional family structure, and the resolution of
such instances should be to provide assistance and support rather than prohibit
210
procreation.
Finally, and again, courts must bear in mind that children have valid perspectives
on family structures. Studies with children consistently show that the child’s
development is not negatively affected by a particular family structure—whether it is
211
traditional, single parent, or same-sex household.
Simultaneously, children of
divorcing or separated parents show poorer psychological adjustment and higher
incidents of behavioral problems and coping with transition to adulthood than
212
children whose fathers have died.
Children further do not view their family
213
structure as wronging them in any way,
and in fact, children have shown to be
quite creative in their approach to kinship. Unlike adults who often frame familial
structures as right or wrong, good or bad, children are particularly adept at
214
developing strategies to comprehend complex family relationships.
Moreover,
children’s creativity has the potential to open up adult understanding of family forms
207

Yael Hashiloni-Dolev & Shiri Shkedi, On New Reproductive Technologies and Family
Ethics: Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis for Sibling Donor in Israel and Germany, 65
SOC. SCI. & MED. 2081, 2087 (2007) (discussing differences between Israeli and German
societies); see also Daphna Birenbaum-Carmeli, The Politics of ‘The Natural Family’ in
Israel: State Policy and Kinship Ideologies, 69 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1018, 1019 (2009).
208

Reza Omani Samani et al., Posthumous Assisted Reproduction from Islamic
Perspective, 2 INT’L J. FERTILITY & STERILITY 96, 98 (2008). Whether an embryo or a preimplantation embryo is considered a child is beyond the scope of this essay.
209

MacCallum & Golombok, supra note 202, at 1407.

210

13530/08 Family Court (Krayot), New Family Org. v. Rambam Med. Ctr. (2009) ¶ 5.2

(Isr ).
211

Sozos J. Fasouliotis & Joseph G. Schenker, Social Aspects in Assisted Reproduction, 5
HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 26, 28 (1999).
212

MacCallum & Golombok, supra note 202, at 1047; see also Pobjoy, supra note 6, at
465, 467 (discussing whether two parents are better than one).
213
214

Moyal & Shelley, supra note 194, at 436.

Jennifer Mason & Becky Tipper, Being Related: How Children Define and Create
Kinship, 15 CHILDHOOD 441, 441 (2008).

2014]

AN INTERNATIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE

61

215

where existing kinship vocabulary is inadequate. Thus, if we are concerned about
the welfare and best interests of posthumously conceived children, further emphasis
should be on what is most important for them—as it is for all other children—that is,
that they enjoy loving and caring familial relationships.
C. Identity Harm
A third argument commonly raised in court cases on posthumously conceived
children concerns identity. Notwithstanding provisions in the CRC requiring states
to preserve the identity of a child (Article 8), some courts have suggested that a
posthumously conceived child is likely to experience identity dilemmas due to the
expectation that he or she take the place of the deceased parent and serve as the
216
deceased’s “memorial candle.”
Certainly, there is something to this argument. In the MAW case, Justice O’Keefe
expressed deep concern over the applicant’s statement in her affidavit that “I feel
that I can’t live without my husband and this [harvesting his sperm] is giving me the
217
opportunity to have at least part of him still with me.”
This concern is especially
valid when parents of the deceased are the ones to pursue the harvesting of gametes
and their use. The mother of a man, who died in military service and who requested
the posthumous harvesting of his sperm for the purpose of having a grandchild,
expressed to an interviewer her sense of tragedy upon his death that he would be
218
buried and nothing of him would be left to her. She was quoted stating,
Just as I am my parents’ roots, he [the deceased] is mine. With all his
beauty—both externally and internally—and with all his good genes . . .
[and given that I have his sperm], people expect that I destroy the
potential of having a grandchild from my son? Sperm is life, it gives life,
219
it is the origin for a whole person.
Similarly, the Russian grandmother whose grandchild the authorities requested
sending to an orphanage said, “Gosha [the grandchild] is a perfect copy of my [dead]
220
son. Now I face losing it all again.”
But, whether this arguable harm justifies a prohibition is questionable.
Procreation is often regarded as a natural desire to “continue the family line” and a
desire to leave a piece of oneself behind. As Rebecca Collins points out,
reproduction provides “philosophical or even spiritual comfort to them to know that
a part of them will continue to live on, that somehow they will be able to ‘beat’

215

Id.

216

Ruth Landau, Planned Orphanhood, 49 SOC. SCI. & MED. 185, 188 (1999).

217

MAW v W. Sydney Area Health Serv. [2000] NSWSC 358; 49 NSWLR 231, ¶¶ 20, 22
(Austl.).
218

Eti Abramov, I Will Fight Until I have a Grandchild from my Dead Son, YEDIOT
February 8, 2013 (translated from Hebrew).

AHARONOT,
219

Id.

220

Leidig, supra note 20, at 627.
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221

death.”
Parental expectation that a child will internalize and reflect pieces of
oneself is therefore not in and of itself unique to posthumous conception. Moreover,
222
while identity is increasingly recognized in legal discourses,
a suggestion that
certain kinds of procreation should be prohibited on the basis of “identity harm”
raise the question: which identities should be protected—or avoided?
Arguments about the harm to one’s identity have been raised in discussing other
assisted reproductive technologies. These include genetic selection against or for
disability, sex selection (commonly on the basis of son preference), and savior
sibling scenario in which doctors attempt to select for implantation in the woman’s
womb a pre-embryo whose genetic tissue composition matches the one of an
existing sick sibling for the purpose of being a cell donor. The common thread
among these scenarios is the suggestion that by so selecting, a parent or doctor
imposes an identity on a child—whether it is a disability-related identity, a fixated
gender-identity, or a donor-identity which is arguably characterized by anxiety,
lesser sense of worth, and living in the shadow of the ill sibling, regardless of his or
223
her other characteristics and interests.
Scholars and courts have also considered
concerns about the harm to children’s identity in gamete donation, where the identity
224
of the donor is unknown.
In this regard, scholars have drawn on accounts of the
experiences of identity bewilderment among adopted children separated from their

221
Rebecca Collins, Posthumous Reproduction and the Presumption Against Consent in
Cases of Death Caused by Sudden Trauma, 30 J. MED. & PHIL. 431, 435 (2005).
222

See, e.g., the set of conventions on human rights and biomedicine adopted at the
European level that explicitly link, for the first time in an international human rights
instrument, biomedicine, human rights, and identity. Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and
Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine art. 1, opened for signature Apr. 4,
1997, E.T.S. No. 164 (entered into force Dec. 1, 1999), http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/
Treaties/Html/164.htm [hereinafter Oviedo Convention]; Additional Protocol to the
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine Concerning Transplantation of Organs and
Tissues of Human Origin art. 1, opened for signature Jan. 24, 2002, E.T.S. No. 186 (entered
into force May 1, 2006), http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/186.htm;
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Concerning
Biomedical Research art. 1, opened for signature Jan. 25, 2005, C.E.T.S. No. 195 (entered
into force Sept. 1, 2007), http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/195.htm.
223

Mark P. Aulisio et al., Procreation for Donation: the Moral and Political Permissibility
of “Having a Child to Save a Child,” 10 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 408, 41317
(2001); Michele Goodwin, My Sister's Keeper: Law, Children, and Compelled Donation, 29
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 357, 364, 371 (2007); Mianna Lotz, Procreative Reasons-Relevance: On
the Moral Significance of Why We Have Children, 23 BIOETHICS 291, 296 (2009).
224

See 13530/08 Family Court (Krayot), New Family Org. v. Rambam Med. Ctr. (2009)
(Isr.); see also X, Y and Z v. United Kingdom, App. No. 21830/93, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 143
(1997). The ECHR denied the joint request of a social family comprised of a biological
mother, a female-to-male transgender father, and an anonymous donor-IVF child that the
(new) man be registered as the father of the child inter alia on the basis of the lack of
consensus among EU members concerning the right of donor-conceived child to know the
donor's identity. Id. at ¶ 44.
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biological parents, concluding that donor-conceived children will have similar
225
experiences.
These are important concerns and they should be taken seriously, especially with
respect to adopted children where there is mounting evidence as to their sense of
loss. However, a few points should be highlighted. The first one is that all identities
are complex and evolving. They are also not fixed. Multiple factors—family
relations, peers, one’s socio-cultural milieu as well as general environment—play an
226
even greater role than genetics in the formation of a child’s (and adult’s) identity.
Studies with children further show that, they have fluid and plural identities, and
regardless of family structure—traditional, single parent or same-sex families—their
227
process of identity formation is similar.
Conversely, children’s identity
construction is significantly influenced by an exclusionary social attitude which sets
them apart. That is, societal attitudes that children with disabilities, girls, adopted
children, or father-absent families are different—not genetics—would influence
228
them the most.
Thus, if we are concerned about the identity of posthumously
conceived children, the focus should be on how to create an inclusive society, where
such children enjoy equal rights, rather than singling them out as a “new special
229
category” of children or dismissing them as parentless or without identity at all.
D. Inheritance and Social Benefits
A final argument over posthumously conceived children is whether they should
be eligible for inheritance and social benefits. As mentioned earlier, this concern has
230
been debated especially in the United States —an unsurprising result of the fact
225

Olga van den Akker, A Review of Family Donor Constructs: Current Research and
Future Directions, 12 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE, 91, 96 (2006); Michelle Dennison, Revealing
Your Sources: The Case for Non-Anonymous Gamete Donation, 21 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 16–17
(2008); A. McWhinnie, Gamete Donation and Anonymity: Should Offspring from Donated
Gametes Continue to Be Denied Knowledge of Their Origins and Antecedents?, 16 HUM.
REPROD. 807, 814 (2001).
226

Yoon-Mi Hur & Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr., Genetic Influences on Perceptions of
Childhood Family Environment: A Reared Apart Twin Study, 66 CHILD DEV. 330, 341 (1995);
Ingmar Persson, Genetic Therapy, Identity and the Person-Regarding Reasons, 9 BIOETHICS
16, 22 (1995).
227

Fasouliotis & Schenker, supra note 211, at 28.

228

Mark Deal, Disabled People’s Attitudes Toward Other Impairment Groups: A
Hierarchy of Impairments, 18 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 897, 899 (2003); MacCallum &
Golombok, supra note 202, at 1415; see also Zoebia Ali, et al., Disability, Ethnicity and
Childhood: A Critical Review of Research, 16 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 961 (2001).
229

MAW v W. Sydney Area Health Serv. [2000] NSWSC 358; 49 NSWLR 231, ¶ 43
(Austl.); Takamatsu Kōtō Saibansho [Takamatsu High Court] July 16, 2004, Case to Seek
Acknowledgement, 2004 (Ju) No. 1748, 60 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHÜ [MINSHÜ] 7
(Japan); Leidig, supra note 20, at 627; see also Pobjoy, supra note 6, at 466-67 (making a
similar point).
230
For some of the scholarly work on this issue, see: Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen
McBrien, Posthumous Reproduction, 39 FAM. L.Q. 579 (2005); David Shayne & Christine
Quigley, Defining ‘Descendants’: Science Outpaces Traditional Heirship, 38 EST. PLAN. J. 14
(2011); John Doroghazi, Note, Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart and Unanswered Questions About
Social Security Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1597
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that all cases concerning posthumous conception in the country, including the
decision of the Supreme Court in the Capato case, revolved around these issues. A
comprehensive discussion about them is beyond the scope of this essay. However,
three brief points are salient.
First, as courts commonly note, the state has a legitimate interest in the orderly
administration of estates. This interest is further increasingly complex given that
many parties may be legitimate beneficiaries of the estate, not least because of the
changes in family structures including, as the Woodward Court points out, “serial
231
marriages, serial families, and blended families.”
Yet, an automatic exclusion of
posthumously conceived children from inheritance cannot hold, and it is possible to
create a more inclusive scheme for the distribution of such assets. As the Manitoba
Law Reform Commission in Canada correctly expressed with respect to inheritance
rights of posthumously conceived children, the values of inclusion outweigh the
232
value of “administrative convenience, simplicity and efficiency.”
Given that it is
recommended that a recently widowed individual wait to proceed with fertility
233
treatment until a certain grieving period has passed,
it should be possible to
extend the time period for inheritance rights beyond the traditional three hundred day
234
period.
The time extension should also take into account that pregnancy may not

(2005); Greenfield, supra note 16; Alycia Kennedy, Note, Social Security Survivor Benefits:
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Children, 54 B.C. L. REV. 821 (2013); Amy L. Komoroski, Comment, After Woodward v.
Commissioner of Social Services: Where Do Posthumously Conceived Children Stand in the
Line of Descent?, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 297 (2002); Christopher A. Scharman, Note, Not
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1001 (2002); Margaret Ward Scott, Comment, A Look at the Rights and Entitlements of
Posthumously Conceived Children: No Surefire Way to Tame the Reproductive Wild West, 52
EMORY L.J. 963 (2003); Susan C. Stevenson-Popp, Comment, “I Have Loved You in My
Dreams”: Posthumous Reproduction and the Need for Change in the Uniform Parentage Act,
52 CATH. U. L. REV. 727 (2003); Suppon, supra note 161.
231

Woodward v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 266 (Mass. 2002). This was also an
issue in the case of Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 26777 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993):
although the deceased (who committed suicide) left a will where he requested that his
girlfriend be granted his sperm for the purpose of procreation, his children from a previous
marriage opposed her request to use the gamete.
232
Posthumously Conceived Children: Intestate Succession and Dependants Relief,
MANITOBA L. REFORM COMMISSION 16 (Nov. 2008), http://www.manitobalawreform.ca/
pubs/pdf/118-full_report.pdf.
233

In Victoria (Australia) and the United Kingdom, the laws regulating posthumous
conception require that fertility treatments are not provided immediately after the death and
that counseling is provided before the medical procedure takes place. See discussion supra
Part I.
234

LEWIS, supra note 15, at 11314. See in this regard recent legal developments in
Province of British Columbia Wills, Estates and Succession Amendment Act, S.B.C. 2011, pt.
2, sec. 8.1 (Can.) (entering into force Mar. 31, 2014), available at http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/
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235

immediately be achieved.
Indeed, as the Woodward court points out, “the oneyear limitations period . . . may pose significant burdens on the surviving parent, and
236
consequently on the child.”
Thus, while such a scheme may be a more complex
process—and may require a case-by-case determination rather than a universal
standard—it will be more responsive to the interests of all involved.
Second, in discussing whether a posthumously conceived child is entitled to
social security benefits, courts have commonly examined whether the child falls
within the scope of a “child” for the purpose of the Social Security Act and whether
237
the child is a “dependent” on the deceased.
Both criteria have often been
answered negatively: the first, because the biological tie was necessary but
insufficient for the determination of parent-child relationship and as death ends the
238
marital status as well as the presumption of a “marital child”; the second, because
the posthumously conceived child could not, practically, enjoy the benefits of his
239
deceased parent’s support during the lifetime of the parent.
In practice, however,
as both the Woodward and Gillett-Netting courts emphasized, neither of these
criteria are set in stone. The marital requirement is not essential when recognizing
240
241
parentage, and all children are dependent. Moreover, given that the deceased’s
amendment of laws pertaining to inheritance and dependant benefits to include posthumously
conceived children when certain criteria are met).
235

Success rates for IVF treatment vary depending on the age of the woman, her general
health, and other factors. Further, the likelihood of conception following ART is estimated to
be about thirtythirty-five percent per cycle for women under the age of thirty-five; most
women need more than one cycle to conceive. The likelihood decreases with age—women
older than forty-four who use their own eggs have only a one percent live birth rate. Daar,
supra note 13, at 18, nn. 54 & 56. See also In Vitro Fertilization: IVF, AM. PREGNANCY
ASS’N, http://www.americanpregnancy.org/infertility/ivf.html (last updated May 2007).
Additionally, the cost of a single cycle of IVF in the US is $10,000 on average, though it can
be twice as much depending on the clinic. Daar, supra note 13, at 20. Medications and any
other procedures, such as screening for disability, PGD, etc., add other expenses. See Selecting
Your Assisted Reproductive Technology Program, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N,
http://americanpregnancy.org/infertility/selectingartprogram.html (last updated April 2012).
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consent for posthumous conception is required (whether by law
or medical
243
practice)
and that child’s social security benefits are based on the deceased’s
earnings during his or her lifetime, the primary beneficiary of excluding
posthumously conceived children is the governmental insurance fund responsible for
244
the distribution of payments.
This cannot be an acceptable—and is certainly not
the only possible—solution.
Finally, in most instances, both inheritance and social security benefits are
unlikely to be unbearably complex or burdensome. With respect to inheritance, the
life-partner of the deceased or his or her parents are those who commonly inherit
from the deceased. And especially when the extended family supports the
posthumous conception, they clearly also express their interest that the resulting
child continues the ‘family line” including by inheritance. The legal acceptance of
such arrangements should thus not stand in the way of the child. Similarly, with
respect to social security benefits, although the number of requests for posthumous
245
conception has increased,
the number of children born as a result is overall very
246
low.
It is also unlikely to become a prevalent or preferable way for procreation.
There is therefore no risk that extending it to all posthumously conceived children
will deplete external sources. Indeed, generosity would be the just response.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the issue of posthumously conceived children has received much media
and popular attention in the past few years, a conversation about the welfare and best
interests of posthumously conceived children has been suspiciously missing from the
discourse. As I have shown, this neglect has extended to judicial decisions on this
issue. However, given that the phenomenon of posthumously conceived children is
not likely to disappear anytime soon —indeed, it is likely to increase—it is important
that we recapture the conversation. Including children’s perspectives either through
research with posthumously conceived children themselves if they are already
sufficiently old or from studies with children in seemingly comparable cases is
essential. Ultimately, posthumously conceived children place the utmost importance
on the relationships around them, both real and abstract; the adults helping to resolve
their dilemmas should take a more relational approach to their welfare and best

242

See discussion, supra Part I.

243

Fertility clinics in the US require it. See also recommendations by the ASRM:
Posthumous Collection and Use of Reproductive Tissue: A Committee Opinion, ETHICS
COMM., AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED. 2 (2013), http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM
_Content/News_and_Publications/Ethics_Committee_Reports_and_Statements/posthumous.p
df.
244

Note that the argument of children born to the deceased from a previous marriage/
relationship, who object to the recognition of posthumously conceived children as additional
dependents, is weak. The deceased is the one who earned the benefit, and once s/he consents
to the posthumous conception, his or her wish should be respected. Put differently, also with
inheritance—existing children have no right to inherit more than what they are owed.
245
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See sources cited, supra note 152 and accompanying text.

Raziel, supra note 63, at 269395 (reporting that most of the harvested gametes are
ultimately not used); see also supra text accompanying note 156.
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interests. This is also the only way that all children, including posthumously
conceived children, will have a fair and equal chance in life.

